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The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), enacted in
1967, prohibits employers who employ at least twenty persons 2 in an
industry affecting interstate commerce from discriminating against per-
sons between the ages of forty and sixty-five in work-related matters.3
The ADEA attempts to insure that hiring and other decisions relating to
an employee's position in his working environment are based on objec-
tive standards of the individual's perceived or potential capabilities
rather than on a generalized value judgment as to the effects of age on
ability.
4
This comment will examine the enforcement sections of the ADEA
to determine whether the seventh amendment right to jury trial 5 at-
taches to the issues arising in a civil action brought under the ADEA.
In order to maintain a private civil action under the ADEA, the
aggrieved party must file notice of intent to sue with the Secretary of
Labor at least sixty days prior to instituting the action and within 180
days after the alleged unlawful practice.6 The notice provision is in-
tended to give the Secretary of Labor time to mediate the grievance
through informal methods of conciliation and persuasion.7
Two major stumbling blocks can prevent the maintenance of a pri-
vate civil action for relief under the ADEA. The Secretary of Labor may
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2. Id. § 630(b).
3. Id. §§ 623, 631.
4. Id. § 621.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VII provides: "In Suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." In
the federal courts, merger of law and equity took place under the Rules Enabl-
ing Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). It is clear from the Rules Enabling Act and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(a) that no substantive change in seventh
amendment law was intended through merger. It also should be noted that the
Supreme Court has not held that the right to jury trial in civil cases is an element
of due process applicable to state courts through the fourteenth amendment.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970). See Age Discrimination in Employment: Available
Federal Relief, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 281 (1975); Comment, Procedural
Aspects of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 36 U. Prrr. L. REv. 914
(1975).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970).
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decide to pursue a section 217 action, as is his right under section 216(b)
of the ADEA,8 which terminates an aggrieved person's right to sue. In
addition, sections 214(b) and 633(a) have been interpreted to require
that the aggrieved party first must contact the appropriate state agency,
which has at least sixty days to solve the complaint. Thus an individual
cannot bypass available state remedies for age discrimination. 9
II. REMEDIES
Section 626(b) of the ADEA 10 empowers an aggrieved individual or
the Secretary of Labor to bring suit for "unpaid minimum wages or
overtime compensation." In addition section 626 empowers federal
courts to "grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to
effectuate the purposes [of the Act]." "1
Section 626(b) also provides that its provisions are to be enforced in
accordance with certain enforcement provisions of the Portal to Portal
Act (PPA).12 Section 216(b) of the PPA provides that an employer who
violates the Act is liable in the amount of unpaid minimum wages plus
an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.' 3 The availability of
compensatory and punitive damages under sections 216 and 217 of the
ADEA will be discussed later in this comment.14
It is well settled in discrimination cases that a plaintiff only need
establish a prima facie case of discrimination to raise a presumption of
discriminatory motive. A prima facie case under the ADEA ordinarily is
shown through age-related advertisements, application forms, involun-
tary retirement policies, statistical evidence, or obvious discriminatory
acts.' 5 Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant employer to justify the discriminatory
act.
16
8. Id. § 216(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
9. Id. §§ 214(b), 633(a). Analogizing § 633(b) of the ADEA to a similar pro-
vision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [hereinafter cited as Title VII],
the Third Circuit held that prior resort to state agencies is jurisdictional. Goger
v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974). See also Hadfield v. Mitre Corp.,
15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1579 (1st Cir. 1977); Prater v. Shell Oil Co., 15 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cases 1114 (W.D. Ky. 1977); Note, Proving Discrimination Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 17 ARIZ. L. REv. 495 (1975).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
11. Id. §§ 626(b), 626(c).
12. The sections of the PPA which are mentioned are 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(b),
216 (except subsection (a) which has been repealed), and 217 (1970 & Supp. V
1975).
13. Liquidated damages are recoverable only for willful violations, 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
14. See text accompanying notes 97-106 infra.
15. See Lindsey v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1977).
16. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (inter-
preting Title VII). See generally Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI.
L. REv. 235 (1971). As to the ambiguous nature of the defendant employer's
2
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
The seventh amendment provides for the right to jury trial in all
actions at common law exceeding the value of twenty dollars. Although
the Federal Rules provide for a completely merged procedure,"7 the dif-
ference between legal and equitable remedies remains important in this
context because the seventh admendment right to jury trial extends only
to trial of "legal" issues. The trial judge must distinguish legal from
equitable issues to decide upon which issues to grant a jury trial.
Crucial to any finding of the right to trial by jury under the ADEA
is a comparison of the actions and remedies encompassed by the Act
with their nearest common law counterparts.' 8 A literal reading of the
seventh amendment would dictate the division of legal and equitable is-
sues simply by reference to the practice in 1791, freezing applicability of
the right to jury trial to situations in which sufficiently similar historical
analogies to the common law can be found. This historical approach,
although seemingly straight-forward, is limited assistance in resolving
jury trial rights in the case of the creation of a cause of action by a
post-1791 statute. The statute may alter the essential character of the
traditional legal action by varying either the elements of the action or
the available remedies.' 9 Of course, if a statutory cause of action has
elements and remedies sufficiently similar to a pre-1791 legal action, the
statute cannot curtail existing jury trial rights.
A modified view of the historical approach, propounded by Mr.
Justice Story, would alleviate much of the analytical difficulty in dividing
legal from equitable issues. Under this view, if a right historically had no
protection in equity, any subsequent protection afforded that right must
be enforceable "at law," because there is no third judicial forum.20 Con-
burden of proof, see Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90
HARV. L. REV. 380, 388-99 (1976).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 2. Federal equity jurisdiction was conferred by Congress
upon lower federal courts in 1789. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78.
Equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts was held to be the same as that of the
High Court of Chancery of England in 1789. Thompson v. Railroad Cos., 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 134, 137 (1867); Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212,
223 (1818).
18. This is the traditional "historical approach" used to fix seventh amend-
ment rights. See, e.g., Baltimore & C. Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657
(1935); F. JAm~s & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.1-.3 (2d ed. 1977). During
the past several years the federal right to jury trial has been expanded, and the
current test utilizes historical inquiry as only the first element of a three-pronged
test. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
19. Two recent Supreme Court cases have indicated that where post-1791
statutes are concerned, a "strict" historical test will not be followed. Instead, the
method by which such rights might have been enforced had they existed in 1791
is a crucial consideration. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis
v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
20. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 474, 478-79 (1830).
[Vol. 43
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sequently, the right to jury trial extends beyond those actions involving
legal rights cognizable under traditional common law remedies; it also
extends to those actions having no historical counterpart in equity.
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions affecting the right to
jury trial have cast doubt on the continued vitality of the historical test as
the sole test to determine the constitutional right to jury trial. Because of
the vast procedural changes undergone by the federal courts in this
century, the Supreme Court has indicated that the conception of the
right to jury trial must be redefined to reflect evolving procedure. Thus
if modern procedure has the effect of correcting the former in-
adequacies inherent in legal remedies 21 by erasing outdated distinctions
between legal and equitable actions,22 a corresponding shrinkage of
equity jurisdiction occurs. The Story method of historical analogy is di-
rectly attuned to expansive notions of legal jurisdiction predicated upon
the removal of various inadequacies inherent in legal remedies.
In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover 2 3 the Supreme Court held that
when both legal and equitable issues are joined within the same con-
troversy and contain similar factual underpinnings, "only under the most
imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible
procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right
to a jury trial be lost through prior determination of equitable claims."
The plaintiff Fox sought a declaratory judgment that the contractual ar-
rangement between Fox and Beacon was not in violation of the antitrust
laws, and also sought an injunction to prohibit Beacon from instituting
any action against Fox under the antitrust laws. Beacon filed a coun-
terclaim asking treble damages for alleged violations of the antitrust
laws. The trial court viewed the issues raised by Fox's prayer for a de-
claratory judgment as essentially equitable and directed that the issues
relating to the complaint be tried prior to any jury determination of the
counterclaim. The Ninth Circuit refused a writ of mandamus to vacate
the order on the basis of the "equitable clean-up" doctrine.24  This doc-
trine states that if equity obtains jurisdiction because of the presence of
an equitable issue in the case, the equity court can dispose of the entire
controversy by deciding both legal and equitable issues .2  The Supreme
Court reversed, finding that the merged procedure of the federal courts
and the effect of the Declaratory Judgment Act rendered the legal rem-
edy of declaratory judgment adequate and foreclosed Fox's equitable
21. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). See also
McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A study of Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1967).
22. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
23. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
24. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1958), rev'd,
359 U.S. 500 (1959).
25. 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 231-242 (5th ed. 1941).
1978] 253
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claim for an injunction. Consequently, the basis of Fox's plea for injunc-
tive relief (inadequacy of legal remedies and irreparable harm pendente
lite) had been removed by expansion of the legal remedy.
The Court continued Beacon's expansive view of the right to jury
trial a few years later in Dairy Queen v. Wood.26 The Court held in Dairy
Queen that to the extent a complaint requests a money judgment, it pre-
sents a legal claim.27  Thus the plaintiff's claim for an accounting and
for a judgment for that amount was found to be a claim for legal relief.
The plaintiff in Dairy Queen, like the plaintiff in Beacon, was denied
equitable relief because of the effect of the Federal Rules on the ade-
quacy of the legal remedy. Citing the power given the district courts to
appoint masters to assist juries in complicated matters, the Court in Dairy
Queen severely limited the traditional equitable accounting cause of ac-
tion in the federal courts.28  Dairy Queen thus can be read as a reaffir-
mation of the Beacon principle that grants the right to jury trial on legal
issues, regardless of whether they are "incidental" to equitable claims.
Dairy Queen also represents a refusal on the part of the Court to consider
only the pleadings in deciding the nature of the relief sought.
The next major pronouncement concerning the right to jury trial
came in Katchen v. Landy,29 where the Supreme Court carved out a small
exception to the Beacon-Dairy Queen rationale. The court held that sum-
mary jurisdiction in bankruptcy includes the power to set aside prefer-
ences without the aid of a jury. Asserting that proceedings of bankruptcy
courts are inherently equitable and that the Bankruptcy Act involves a
specific statutory scheme contemplating the prompt trial of disputed
claims without the intervention of a jury, the Court denied petitioner's
claim for a jury trial on the issue of preference. 30
The expansion of the right to jury trial was continued in Ross v.
Bernhard31 where the Supreme Court granted a jury trial in a share-
holder derivative suit, even though shareholder standing in such a suit
traditionally had been recognized only in equity. The Court again em-
phasized the disappearance of procedural impediments to the presenta-
tion of both legal and equitable issues.32 Thus, if the claim on behalf of
the corporation presents a legal issue, the parties to a shareholders' de-
rivative suit have the same seventh amendment right to a jury trial that
historically belonged only to the corporation. This is another example of
how the Federal Rules obviate a class of equitable remedies by curing the
law's procedural inadequacies.
26. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
27. Id. at 476.
28. Id. at 478. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
29. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
30. Congressional intent and practical necessity formed the basis for the
Court's rejection in Katchen of the Beacon-Dairy Queen jury trial policy.
31. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
32. Id. at 542-43.
254 [Vol. 43
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An additional impact of Ross was a reiteration by the Court of a
three-part test which had been developing since Beacon. To determine
the legal or equitable nature of a particular issue, the test requires in-
quiry first into "the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions;
second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and limita-
tions of juries." 33
A. Unitary Claim for Unpaid Wages
The initial determination a court must make in deciding whether a
plaintiff asserting a claim for lost wages will be entitled to a jury trial
under the ADEA is whether Congress intended the issue to be tried by a
jury. 4 Congress cannot statutorily deny the right to jury trial if that
right otherwise would attach. 35 Conversely, the seventh amendment
does not prevent the statutory expansion of the right to jury trial; there is
no constitutional right to a non-jury trial under the seventh amendment.
Therefore, Congress can expand the right to jury trial to encompass
what otherwise might be an equitable action. The ADEA contains no
express provision denying the right to jury trial of any issue which might
arise under any of the available remedial provisions, and the legislative
history on the topic is scant and inconclusive.36
However, congressional intent has provided the basis for the Su-
preme Court's only ruling on the right to jury trial under the ADEA. In
Lorillard v. Pons 3 7 the Court held that the selective inclusion of parallel
enforcement mechanisms and procedures of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) 38 with the authorization of "legal" relief in section 626(b) of
the ADEA sufficiently established congressional intent that a private civil
action under the ADEA should be tried to a jury upon demand.
The correctness of the Court's utilization of indirect indicia of intent
to find a "fairly possible" construction of the ADEA by which the un-
33. Id. at 538 n.10.
34. Resolution of the seventh amendment issue must focus initially on possi-
ble statutory constructions through which constitutional questions might be
avoided. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); United States v.
Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971).
35. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974). But see Katchen
v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
36. The whole test [of discrimination by an employer] is somewhat like
the test in an accident case-did the person use reasonable care. A
jury will answer yes or no .... The Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not
cover age discrimination .... [T]he laws will operate completely in-
dependently of each other, as will the enforcement procedures.
113 CONG. REC. 31,255 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
37. 46 U.S.L.W. 4150 (1978), aff'g 549 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1977).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-260 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The right to jury trial
exists in a § 216 action under the FLSA. E.g., Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901 (5th
Cir. 1965). The relief available to a § 216 plaintiff under the ADEA is broader in
that equitable as well as legal relief may be awarded.
6
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derlying seventh amendment question was avoided will not be dealt with
in this comment. It should be noted, however, that the use of congres-
sional intent to decide whether a statutory right to jury trial exists under
the ADEA is consistent with the expansive notions of the right to jury
trial typified by the Story method of historical analogy and the Beacon-
Dairy Queen decisions. Statutory construction cannot defeat the right
where it is constitutionally mandated,3 9 but can provide the right where
it would not otherwise exist.
The precise scope of the holding in Lorillard is unclear in that the
Court did not state whether the statutory right to jury trial existed for all
issues under the ADEA or merely for the issues comprising the relief
sought by the plaintiff in Lorillard.40  It also must be remembered that
the holding in Lorillard may subsequently be altered by Congress. As
such, the constitutional issues raised in this comment remain relevant.
Lacking a clear expression of congressional intent, the next step in
determining the right to jury trial for a lost wages claim is to focus on
the constitutional right to jury trial beginning with the pre-merger cus-
tom with respect to such a claim.41 Analyzing a section 216 action for
unpaid wages under the three-part Ross test, it is apparent that only lim-
ited parallels can be drawn to pre-merger practice. To recover for a
discriminatory employment practice, the ADEA plaintiff must show that
he was refused employment or promotion, or that he was treated in
some other manner violative of section 623 of the Act.42 If the histori-
cal analogue of this statutory cause of action was triable to a jury at
common law, then it is now triable to a jury by right under the seventh
amendment. The modern action and its historical counterpart need not
be identical, so long as the court deems that they embrace the same basic
legal right.43
Wrongful discharge and, to a more limited extent, employment dis-
crimination were actionable at common law. Wrongful discharge of an
employee would support a recovery of "lost wages" in an action tried to
a jury at common law, even when no assumpsit or quantum meruit
would lie because no work was done subsequent to final payment and
discharge. 44
39. Cf. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966). See text accompanying notes
29-30 supra and notes 87-91 infra.
40. The relief sought in Lorilard was reinstatement, lost wages, liquidated
damages, and attorney's fees and costs.
41. This is the "historical approach," the first element of the three-part Ross
test for determining the federal right to jury trial for any particular issue in a
civil action.
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 623(c) (1970).
43. See note 19 supra.
44. B. SHIPMANN, COMMON LAW PLEADING 153-69 (3d ed. 1926); 2 J.
SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES 471-78 (1883).
[Vol. 43256
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In this situation, the discharged servant was said to have the option
of treating the employment contract as continuing and could bring suit
for breach of contract by reason of the wrongful discharge. This remedy
was mentioned in dictum in Lampleigh v. Brathwait 45 and subsequently
became so settled that in 1853 Justice Compton of the House of Lords
stated: "I am not aware that [this remedy] has ever been doubted
"46
A serious analytical problem arises in attempting to analogize this
ancient common law cause of action to the relief encompassed by the
ADEA's lost wages action. The common law relief was in essence a suit
on the contract where dismissal constituted a breach. The ADEA's
coverage is far broader in that the discriminatory failure to hire or pro-
mote almost certainly will involve issues entirely independent of any
contractual obligation.47 Consequently, this area of the ADEA's cover-
age is more analogous to a tort action because the employer's duty not to
discriminate is imposed by statute and not by a contract between the
parties.4 8 The ADEA has expanded immensely the common law cover-
age of employment discrimination and has changed the nature of the
right being enforced.
Although the Story method of historical analogy would find the first
element of the Ross test met and initially classify the loss wages claim as
legal, failure of a direct historical analogy would preclude such a deter-
mination because no passable common law equivalent to the ADEA can
be found. Nonetheless, several courts have found the historical analogy
segment of the Ross test met,4 9 while others simply have declared such
an award legal in nature.5°
On the other hand, several courts have found that the lost wages
award can be characterized as a form of equitable relief,5' and at least
two courts have indicated that damages in the form of lost wages, with-
45. 80 Eng. Rep. 255 (1616).
46. Emmens v. Elderton, 10 Eng. Rep. 606, 615 (1853).
47. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 623(c) (1970).
48. Several commentators have taken the position that employment discrimi-
nation should be actionable in tort rather than contract. See, e.g., W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS § 124 (3d ed. 1964); Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 430 (1965); Note, Tort
Remedies for Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 54 VA. L. REv. 491 (1968).
49. See, e.g., Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engr. Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.
1977); Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 46 U.S.L.W. 4150(1978); Rechsteiner v. Madison Fund, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 499 (D. Del. 1977).
50. Davis v. Adams-Cates Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 397 (N.D. Ga.
1977); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977);
Locascio v. Teletype Corp., 74 F.R.D. 108 (N.D. 11. 1977); Fellows v. Medford
Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199 (D. Or. 1977); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 15
Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 222 (W.D. Va. 1977).
51. See note 84 infra.
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/4
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
out any other decree, can comprise an equitable award under the
ADEA. 5
2
Traditionally, a court sitting in equity only infrequently made
awards comprised solely of an order for the payment of money.3 How-
ever, an order for the payment of money, which might be analogized to
a lost wages award, could be made by an equity court pursuant to a
decree of a constructive trust, an action for an accounting, or through
an action for equitable restitution. The constructive trust analogy fails
because a constructive trust traditionally required a trust res. 5 4 Because
the employer will not have segregated the funds which by right belonged
to the ADEA plaintiff, the only possible reasoning under a constructive
trust theory is that the obligation imposed on the employer by the
ADEA itself constitutes a trust res.55 However, even under this rather
strained logic, the constructive trust analogy fails because the obligor
cannot be the trustee of his own obligation.
5 6
Similarly, the action for lost wages cannot be characterized as an
accounting action because there is nothing inherently difficult or con-
fusing about the nature of the "transactions" between the parties. It
likewise would not be difficult to compute the amount of lost wages due
plaintiff should the employer's liability be established. 57
Several courts have indirectly analogized the lost wages award to an
action for equitable restitution. 58 However, if the only remedy sought is
restitution of lost wages, the action properly would be characterized as
legal rather than equitable. In praying for a money judgment, the
ADEA plaintiff has admitted the adequacy of such an award; therefore,
a court of equity would be without jurisdiction to grant monetary res-
titution.59
52. Travers v. Corning Glass Works, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 584 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (dictum); Ewald v. Great A & P Tea Co., 73 F.R.D. 374 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
53. Equitable relief developed largely because of the inadequacy of money
judgments. Equitable restitution could only be had when the complaint based
equity jurisdiction on mistake of fact, duress, undue influence, or where en-
forcement of the restitution decree was through a constructive trust, equitable
lien, or subrogation. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES § 4.3, at
240-52 (1973); RESTATMENT OF RESTITUTION 640-61 (1937).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 74 (1959).
55. Rousseau v. Call, 169 N.C. 173, 85 S.E. 414 (1915).
56. Johnson v. Commissioner, 108 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1939).
57. Equity had jurisdiction to compel an accounting only where the relief at
law was inadequate. See 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 25, § 1421. In addition, recov-
ery under this theory would be limited to the defendant's identifiable profit
which can be attributed to the harm done to the plaintiff, i.e., the increase in
defendant's profits attributable to plaintiff's job replacement. Hamilton-Brown
Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916).
58. See, e.g., Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1976).
59. The ADEA plaintiff's claim for lost wages is substitutionary legal restitu-
tion for the value of his services. The plaintiff would have no use for specific
restitution because his object is not to compel defendant to perform similar ser-
[Vol. 43258
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It is doubtful, therefore, that a claim for lost wages under the
ADEA can convincingly be characterized as either "legal" or "equitable"
by direct analogy to ancient forms of action. The pre-merger analogue
segment of the three-part Ross test has been treated with only minimal
deference since the Beacon, Dairy Queen and Ross decisions. Thus to the
extent that this discredited element of the Ross test produces inconclusive
results, it should have little bearing on any final determination of the
jury trial right.
However, adoption of the Story theory might revitalize the pre-
merger custom test. Justice Story's oft-repeated position that the protec-
tion of the seventh amendment extends to all suits except those within the
jurisdiction of equity or admiralty as of 1791,60 would by implication
make "legal" all rights which were not fixed in equity as of that date.
This rationale was adopted by the Ross Court, which recognized that
even suits which originally were cognizable only in equity, e.g., an ac-
counting, eventually can be "worked over" into the law.6 1 Because no
sufficiently clear analogue exists to a pre-merger equitable form of re-
lief, the Story method would conclude that the cause of action must pre-
sent "legal" issues regardless of "whatever may be the peculiar form
which they may assume to settle legal rights." 6 2
The second element of the Ross test focuses on the nature of the
remedy sought. Fundamental to any inquiry concerning the nature of
the remedy for lost wages available to an individual under section 216 of
the ADEA is an analysis of the same lost wages award when recovered
by the Secretary pursuant to section 217 of the Act.
Section 217, like the enforcement section of Title VII, authorizes
equitable relief only in the form of an injunction. However, as in Title
VII, section 217 expressly authorizes a lost wages award in the form of
an order restraining the withholding of payment of lost wages. Because
vices for him. Because a money judgment is the plaintiff's object, equity should
not intervene as the available legal relief is adequate, and equity's intervention
normally causes the loss of the seventh amendment right to jury trial. See D.
DOBBS, supra note 53, § 4.4 at 256-60. It may be that an equity court has juris-
diction to make such an award and the burden is on the aggrieved party to
object and appeal or waive the error. See 2 Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY
296-380 (1950); D. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 2.7, at 82-83.
60. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1830), cited with approval in
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974).
61. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539-41 (1970). Historically, the bound-
ary between law and equity has been fluid. Continuous interaction between the
two judicial entities resulted in concurrent jurisdiction for many types of cases.
Equity often preceded law in recognizing various rights. When the law courts
began using the "new" equitable devices, they were said to have "worked over"
into law. 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 595-97 (1938); F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.2 (2d ed. 1977).
62. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 447 (1830).
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the courts have jurisdiction to grant only equitable awards under section
217, cases decided thereunder uniformly have denied the right to jury
trial on the issue of lost wages, even though the sums recovered by the
Secretary are paid directly to the affected employees. 63 The rationale in
denying the right to jury trial in section 217 actions has been that the
enforcement of a monetary award as an incident of injunctive relief
promotes the public interest by assuring effective and uniform com-
pliance with the Act, and that such enforcement is not primarily a tool
for the reimbursement of private plaintiffs through civil litigation. How-
ever, the only apparent reason the lost wages award is considered equit-
able when granted pursuant to section 217 is because the discretionary
language of the section does not expressly authorize legal relief.61
Section 216 of the ADEA allows an individual to recover "the
amount of [his] unpaid minimum wages." Section 626(c) allows an indi-
vidual to seek "such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes
of this chapter." Normally an equitable decree is available only upon a
showing that the remedy at law is inadequate. 65 It may be, however,
that Congress has eliminated the necessity of a private plaintiff showing
the inadequacy of legal remedies in a section 216 action, or has substi-
tuted a "purpose furthering" requirement so that a private individual
may seek a unitary decree restraining the withholding of payment of lost
wages in lieu of a mere "legal" lost wages claim. 66
However, the fact that a federal statute may have done away with
the necessity of showing the legal remedy inadequate before availing a
private plaintiff of an equitable decree should not mandate the further
conclusion that such statutory expansion of equity jurisdiction should
cause a contraction of the right to jury trial. If a plaintiff need not show
that, as to his particular lost wages claim, the remedy at law is in-
63. See cases cited in Chilton v. National Cash Register Co., 370 F. Supp.
660, 662 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
64. Section 216(b) states: "Any employer who violates ... this title shall be
liable .. ."; whereas § 217 provides: "The district courts ... shall have jurisdic-
tion, for cause shown, to restrain violations ... including ... the restraint of any
withholding of payment of minimum wages...." 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 217 (1970
& Supp. V 1975).
65. See note 59 supra.
66. Section 626(c) provides: "Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action
... for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chap-
ter .. " 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1970). "[Tlhe standards of the public interest, not
the requirements of private litigation, measure the propriety and need for in-junctive relief in these cases." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944)(action under § 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942). "[W]here an
injunction is authorized by statute it is unnecessary for plaintiff to plead and
prove the existence of the usual equitable grounds, irreparable injury and ab-
sence of an adequate remedy at law. It is enough if the requirements of the
statute are satisfied." Shadid v. Fleming, 160 F.2d 752, 753 (10th Cir. 1947);
Henderson v. Burd, 133 F. 2d 515 (2d Cir. 1943).
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adequate, he is able to assert the admittedly legal claim in pursuit of an
equitable remedy. The possibility of concurrent or alternate jurisdiction
for the lost wages award might allow a plaintiff to destroy the defen-
dant's right to jury trial merely by electing the available equitable rem-
edy. Alternatively, if a showing of legal inadequacy has been obviated,
concurrent jurisdiction might indicate that Congress purposefully has
de-emphasized the role of equity in remedial distinctions. Given the
normal presumption in favor of a constitutional right, if the latter view is
adopted, the right to jury trial should still attach to the admittedly legal
issues which will govern the equitable award. Further support for the
"remedial de-emphasis" argument can be found through converse in-
quiry into the Beacon, Dairy Queen, and Ross decisions. The expansive
view of the right to jury trial evident in those cases is predicated on the
law courts' adoption of procedures which remove former inadequacies of
legal remedies. Such a view would be inconsistent with allowing the
statutory removal of the inadequacy requirement to expand equity juris-
diction and correspondingly contract the right to jury trial.
The third element of the Ross test would characterize as equitable
those issues which are beyond the practical abilities of jurors. The tradi-
tional concern of the equity courts was the inadequacy of jury trial on
complicated issues. Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
this element may operate to defeat the jury right,67 the availability of
court-appointed masters to aid in sophisticated factual inquiries 68 in
ADEA litigation would appear to weaken this basis for denying a jury
trial.
It has been suggested that jury trials are inappropriate in civil rights
cases not only because of the complexity of the issues involved, but also
because of the dangers of jury prejudice and inconsistent decisions.6 9
However, a fundamental constitutional guarantee should not yield to
congressionally perceived inadequacies of the jury system as a method of
implementing the right to jury trial; the constitutional limitations im-
posed on legislators might create merely transparent rights which would
be cast aside to achieve a "higher good."
An additional argument has been used to defeat jury trial rights in
Title VII actions. The enforcement section of Title VII grants the court
discretion in awarding back pay subsequent to a finding of unlawful dis-
crimination. Courts have found that the grant of discretion makes the
67. Apparently congressional declarations concerning jury inadequacy in
legislation creating a cause of action are without any effect in deciding the issue;
the third element of the Ross test can be decided only by the courts. Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.56 (1974).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
69. See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109 (1971).
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award equitable, since legal awards are mandatory by nature.70 Al-
though the discretionary nature of the award can be construed as con-
gressional intent that the newly created statutory right be considered
equitable for seventh amendment purposes, 71 such indicia of intent
should not be a stopping point in determining jury trial rights. In any
event, the enforcement sections of the ADEA, except for section 217, are
drafted in mandatory terms and provide for both legal and equitable
remedies. Thus the argument that Congress intended only equitable re-
medies for the lost wages claim is without merit.
The fact that the ADEA's enforcement procedures differ signifi-
cantly from the manner in which a private litigant normally pursues a
"legal" claim also might have an effect on whether the issues involved in
recovering a lost wages claim are to be considered legal or equitable. It
has been argued in similar contexts that where the enforcement of
statutory rights involves substantive differences from the enforcement of
analogous common law rights, the "strangeness" of the statutory scheme
to the common law precludes triggering of the seventh amendment's
protection.72 Even cursory inspection of the burdensome features of
the two-tier process through which a private action evolves under the
ADEA illustrates plainly that job restitution and not money damages is
the principal relief contemplated by the Act. Thus it can be argued that
a lost wages claim under the ADEA should not trigger seventh amend-
ment jury trial rights. Katchen v. Landy may provide some support for
this position. 73 However, adoption of this argument would vitiate the
Story theory74 and weaken the protection of the seventh amendment
because the right in question is enforced by article III courts.
Although the section 216 lost wages award should be available in the
form of an in personam order of the court, the award most certainly
70. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK ON
THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 21 (2d ed. 1948).
71. Congress could not avoid the limitations of the seventh amendment
merely by making an otherwise legal award discretionary with the court. Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
72. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 90 (1965); 5 J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.06-.07 (1971). For a good discussion on how the ADEA
defers to administrative processes to a lesser extent than Title VII, see Bertrand
v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977). Congressional
preference for the administrative process of the ADEA is indicated in 113 Cong.
Rec. 31,254 (Nov. 6, 1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits); 113 CONG. REC. 31,253 (Nov.
6, 1967) (remarks of Sen. Yarbrough); 113 CONG. REC. 31,250 (Nov. 6,
1967)(Committee Report).
73. 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966), cited with approval in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 195 (1974).
74. If a right historically has no corresponding protection in equity, any
protection afforded the right subsequently must be enforceable at law because
there is no third judicial forum.
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presents legal issues under the Story interpretation of the seventh
amendment. Thus the right to jury trial should attach to all issues de-
cided pursuant to the lost wages claim. Section 216 is somewhat similar
to the enforcement section of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 in that both
sections are couched in mandatory, and not discretionary, language. The
Supreme Court recently said that such mandatory phrasing substantially
affects the characterization of the award as legal. 75  There is no multi-
tier system of enforcement under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, but if the
Story interpretation of the seventh amendment is accepted, the fact that
there is a multi-tier process under the ADEA should not alter the pri-
mary factor: that legal rights are being decided.
B. Injunctive Reinstatement in Addition
to an Award of Lost Wages
Several courts have distinguished the unitary lost wages award from
situations in which the lost wages award is made concurrently with an in
personam, equitable order of the court.7 6 Fundamental to the assertion
that the addition of an equitable decree can remove the right to jury
trial is the position that the lost wages claim awarded in conjunction with
an equitable decree of reinstatement does not present a separate and
distinct claim, but rather one non-severable equitable cause of action.
7 7
The lost wages claim thus is viewed as "an integral part of the basic
equitable claim for reinstatement. 7 8
The Beacon-Dairy Queen rationale mandates a jury trial on all issues
common to the legal and equitable claims joined in a single civil action.
Therefore, it must be determined whether the addition of the lost wages
claim creates a distinct and severable "legal" claim 'or is an integral part
of the requested injunctive relief.7 9
The ADEA expressly grants jurisdiction to federal district courts to
make a combined award of reinstatement and lost wages.8 0 As discussed
above, a lost wages award lacks significant historical similarity to any
75. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. at 196-98.
76. See, e.g., Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1976); Travers
v. Corning Glass Works, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Cobb v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 408 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
77. If the claims are severable, Beacon and Dairy Queen bar the operation of
the equitable clean-up doctrine to remove otherwise available seventh amend-
ment rights.
78. Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1976).
79. Recovery of lost wages is in no way contingent upon being successfully
reinstated and vice versa. To state that the lost wages claim can be viewed as an
integral part of a totally independent remedy is merely an attempt to escape the
clear holding of Dairy Queen. See Comment,Jury Trial in Employment Discrimination
Cases -Constitutionally Mandated?, 53 TEX. L. REv. 483, 501-05 (1975), for an ex-
cellent analysis of the "integral element" characterization.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
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pre-merger equitable decree 8l or common law remedy.82  However, ini-
tial inquiry into the possible historical analogues to the combined
reinstatement and lost wages award should not be precluded even by a
finding that the unitary lost wages award, because of factors other than
the pre-merger custom test, presents legal issues.
Historical inquiry must be directed toward the possible existence of
an ancient equitable remedy which incorporated analogous elements of
the combined reinstatement and lost wages award and which was not
merely a combined legal and equitable remedy granted by a court of
equity pursuant to its "clean-up" or "concurrent" jurisdiction. 83
The "analysis" used by most courts which have characterized the
combined award as equitable has been a broad statement of equity's
jurisdiction to provide complete relief to the parties combined with a
brief policy justification for finding the award equitable,8 4 or merely a
citation to a similar case.85 The justification in these cases for the dis-
trict courts' jurisdiction to make an equitable decree has obscured the
attendant jury trial right to those legal awards made in conjunction with
equitable decrees. In no sense other than through "clean-up" jurisdiction
can the money claim be characterized as "equitable."8 6
The enforcement provisions of the ADEA and the Katchen holding
may complicate this conclusion. By allowing the Secretary (under section
217) and an individual (under section 216) to seek reinstatement, Con-
81. See text accompanying notes 42-50 supra.
82. See text accompanying notes 51-59 supra.
83. Corbin states thiat restitution is not available unless the defendant has
received value from the plaintiff, 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1107, at 573 n.21
(1964); but Moore states that it also may be used to restore the status quo, 5 J.
MooRE, supra note 72, § 38.24, at 190.5. Historically, equity courts likely would
have refused to make the combined reinstatement and lost wages award because
an award of specific performance of an employment contract was so rare as to be
almost nonexistent. See "11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 1423, at 786-88 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968). See authorities cited note 87 infra.
84. The policy justification is ordinarily the perceived similarity of the ADEA
to Title VII. See, e.g., Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 1976);
Polstorff v. Fletcher, 430 F. Supp. 592, 594 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (combined award of
lost wages and reinstatement comprises action for discretionary equitable restitu-
tion); Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 217 (D. Colo. 1977);
Travers v. Coming Glass Works, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 584, 588 (S.D.N.Y,
1977); Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Pa. 1976).
85. E.g., Cobb v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 408, 411(N.D. Ga. 1977) (citing Morelock); Ewald v. Great A & P Tea Co., 15 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cases 590 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (citing Laugesen).
86. Compare Porter v. Warner Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946) and Mitchell v. Robert
DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960) (both authorized expansion of fed-
eral district court jurisdiction on the basis of equitable principles) with Dairy
Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479 (1962) (under merged procedure legal claims
cannot be awarded as "incident" to equitable claims to defeat seventh amend-
ment jury trial rights).
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gress has made available a remedy which would be almost certainly not
otherwise available. Reinstatement is merely specific performance of an
employment contract, and the general rule is that an employee may not
obtain specific performance of an employment contract, even when the
contract is breached by wrongful discharge.17  The employee, but for
the presence of the ADEA, would be relegated to a claim for damages.
However, where only reinstatement is sought, there is no right to a jury
trial under the ADEA.8 8 Thus Congress has converted the employee's
remedy from what would otherwise be an action at law with the right to
jury trial into an equitable action which carries no jury right. This would
appear to violate the seventh amendment.
It can be argued, however, that by allowing reinstatement and even
the combined award of reinstatement and lost wages without a jury trial,
Congress has neither violated the Beacon-Dairy Queen rationale, nor the
more easily met "historical" seventh amendment test.
At least in the bankruptcy area, it is still possible for an otherwise
legal claim to become sufficiently equitable to cause loss of the right to
jury trial when such claim is asserted in a summary bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.89 Such a rule is, at the least, an exception to the explicit hold-
ing of Dairy Queen. It may be, however, that Katchen illustrates that the
holding in Dairy Queen was not constitutionally mandated, but only indi-
cated the policy of the Supreme Court to prevent further erosion of the
seventh amendment's protection in the merged federal court system. 90 If
this is so, Congress then could legislate to the permissible boundaries of
the historical test of the seventh amendment, not bound by the Beacon-
Dairy Queen decisions. Historically, equity enjoyed jurisdiction to sum-
marily decide preference claims as an incident of its bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion.91 Thus, the holding in Katchen fits within this theory.
If this theory is accepted as an explanation for the diversity between
Beacon-Dairy Queen and Katchen, historical inquiry must focus on possible
elements of ancient equitable jurisdiction which would allow a payment
87. See D. DOBBS, supra note 53, at 929; 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 25, at 1343;
11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 83, § 1423, at 783-85; Van Hecke, Changing Empha-
ses in Specizfw Performance, 40 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1961).
88. There are no reported cases in which a jury trial was sought under § 217
in an ADEA action. It is well settled that actions brought under § 217 in an
FSLA action do not require a jury trial upon demand. Paradise Valley Investiga-
tion & Control Serv., Inc. v. Dunlop, 521 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1975); Sullivan v.
Wirtz, 359 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 852 (1966); Wirtz v. Jones,
340 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1965); Hodgson v. Steward In-Fra-Red Commissary, Inc.,
370 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
89. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
90. See Comment, The Seventh Amendment and Civil Rights Statutes: History
Adrift in a Maelstrom, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 503, 534-35 (1973).
91. See 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 25, §§ 1334, 1413-15. Note, however, that
the Bankruptcy Act gives 'Jurisdiction at law and in equity" to the bankruptcy
courts. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1970).
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of lost wages in conjunction with an "incidental" award of reinstatement.
The underlying statutory purposes of the ADEA also must be compared
to the components of the Bankruptcy Act which influenced the court in
Katchen.
It was stated previously that under some circumstances orders for
the payment of money might be awarded pursuant to an equitable de-
cree without any right to jury trial.9 2 The only other situation in which
equity courts would entertain a claim for money damages was when the
claim was joined with a plea for an in personam and thus equitable
order of the court, pursuant to the court's "clean-up" jurisdiction. 9 3
Such "concurrent" jurisdiction would not be possible under the
ADEA. Because an employee normally cannot get specific performance
of an employment contract, no in personam order of the court is gener-
ally available. 94 Under the Story method of historical analogy,
reinstatement would encompass legal issues because the only pre-1791
remedy available to an employee would be an action for damages for
breach of the employment contract. The fact that an in personam order
is made available by the ADEA should not change this basic legal nature
of the reinstatement award. Although Congress can provide for equita-
ble remedies to attach to legal claims, it cannot remove the right to a
jury trial on legal issues. 95 Hence there would appear to be no tradi-
tionally available in personam order of the court to provide initial equity
jurisdiction. The effect of allowing "incidental" jurisdiction of the lost
wages claim to defeat the right to jury trial would be to bootstrap the
legal claim of lost wages through the use of the reinstatement claim
which also presents legal issues.
In addition, the ADEA does not appear to be the type of "specific
statutory scheme contemplating the prompt trial of a disputed claim
without the intervention of a jury" held to be so crucial in Katchen.90 In
sum, there appears to be no justification for denying the right to jury
trial for all issues comprising a combined job reinstatement-lost wages
award.
C. Compensatory and Punitive Damages
Although not specifically mentioned as an available remedy under
the ADEA, several courts have allowed recovery of compensatory 97 and
92. See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
93. Camp v. Boyd, 229 U.S. 530, 552 (1912); 5 J. MOORE, supra note 72, §
38.19, at 169.
94. See authorities cited note 87 supra.
95. In Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974), the Court held
that the seventh amendment's applicability was unaffected by congressional ac-
tion where the statutory action involved common law rights brought in a federal
court of general jurisdiction.
96. 382 U.S. at 339.
97. Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977);
Davis v. Adams-Cates Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 397 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Ber-
266 [Vol. 43
17
Minton: Minton: Right to Jury Trial under the Age Discrimination
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
punitive damages in section 216 actions. The propriety of granting
such relief under the ADEA is beyond the scope of this article.99 How-
ever, to the extent that such damages are recoverable, the Supreme
Court's holding in Curtis v. Loether, 100 that there is a right to jury trial
for compensatory and punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act of
1968, practically assures a similar result under the ADEA.
Compensatory damages recoverable under civil rights statutes ordi-
narily do not attempt to reimburse the plaintiff for actual pecuniary
harm. 10 1 The purpose of compensatory damages is to effect compliance
with the statute, while providing a money recovery for deprivation of
statutorily protected interests. This deprivation is merely measured in
monetary terms. As such, compensatory damages are "substitutionary
relief." 102 Regardless of whether the statutory cause ,of action is
analogized to breach of contract or tort, if an award of damages is the
relief sought by an ADEA plaintiff, his remedy at law is clearly, adequate.
Equitable relief therefore would be inappropriate. Further, courts which
have allowed recovery of compensatory damages in ADEA actions have
done so because the ADEA was viewed as a new statutory tort.10 3 Juries
typically determine the amount of-compensatory damage awards; thus
the three-part Ross test would mandate the right to jury trial on all issues
comprising a claim for compensatory damages.
A split of authority exists on the availability of punitive damages in
an ADEA action.' 0 4 Historically, punitive damage awards were dis-
trand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. i123 (N.D. II1. 1976), aff'd on
rehearing, 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977). Contra, cases cited note 104 infra;
Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 889 (5th Cir. 1977);
Rechsteiner v. Madison Fund, Inc., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 216 (D. Del. 1977);
Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215 (D. Colo. 1977); Sant v.
Mack Trucks, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
98. Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977);
Davis v. Adams-Cates Co., 15 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cases 397 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Mur-
phy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
99. See Richards, Monetary Awards for Age Discrimination in-Employment, 30
AmK. L. REv. 305 (1976); Richards, Compensatory and Punitive Damages in Employ-
ment Discrimination Cases, 27 ARK. L. REV. 603 (1974); Note, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV.
47 (1976); Note, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 642 (1976).
100. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
101. This presumably is the function of the lost wages award and to a lesser
extent, the liquidated damages award under the ADEA. See the "back pay" pro-
vision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
102. D. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 3.1, at 135.
103. See cases cited note 97 supra.
104. Cases which have held that punitive damages are not available under the
ADEA include Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engr. Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.
1977); Travers v. Corning Glass Works, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 584 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Cobb v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 408 (N.D. Ga.
1977). Contra, cases cited note 98 supra.
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cretionary with the jury,105 and equity courts would neither make puni-
tive damage awards nor help to enforce punitive damage awards ob-
tained in law courts.'0 6 Because the remedy is in the form of a money
judgment, and because juries have traditionally been allowed to decide
punitive damage issues, punitive damages present legal issues if recover-
able under the ADEA.
D. Liquidated Damages
Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act' 0 7 provides that
employers who are found to be in violation of the Act are liable not only
for lost wages, but also for an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages.' 0 8 In 1974 section 260 of the PPA amended section 216 and
gave the courts discretion to reduce or disallow a liquidated damages
award if the employer could show good faith and reasonable grounds
for believing his acts did not violate the FLSA.' 0 9
Section 626(b) of the ADEA incorporates section 216(b) but makes
no mention of section 260's applicability. Section 626(b) merely states
"that liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful viola-
tions of this chapter."110 If section 260 of the PPA permitting dis-
cretionary reduction of the liquidated damages award is not applicable to
a section 216 action under the ADEA, then given the mixed compensat-
ory and punitive aspects of the award, the right to jury trial should at-
tach to the only issue to be determined, i.e., whether the violation was
willful.
If section 260 of the PPA is applicable to a section 216 award in an
ADEA action, a more complex problem is presented. The element of
discretion contained in section 260 is similar to the discretion granted
the courts under Title VII." In Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody'
1 2
the Supreme Court cited Curtis for the proposition that "the court's dis-
cretion is equitable in nature." 113 In Curtis it is apparent that the Court
105. Fleitmann v. Welsback St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27, 29 (1916); Decora-
tive Stone Co. v. Building Trades Council, 23 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1928) (right
to recover penal damages enforceable only in a common law action).
106. 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 25, §§ 433-460(d).
107. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
108. Id. § 216(b).
109. Id. § 260.
110. Id. § 626(b).
111. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) ("the court may, in its
sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof")
with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975) ("the court may ... order such af-
firmative action as may be appropriate ... or any other equitable relief as the
court deems appropriate").
112. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
113. Id. at 416.
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found equally decisive the fact that Title VII authorizes only equitable
awards."14
Even if section 260 is held to be a part of the ADEA by virtue of
amending section 216, it is difficult to see how congressional provisions
granting discretion to the courts are any less violative of the seventh
amendment than any other functional abridgement of jury trial rights, if
such discretion effectively removes a legal issue from the province of the
jury. Thus regardless of section 260's applicability, all issues involved in
a liquidated damages claim should be tried to a jury.
V. Conclusion
The right to jury trial under the ADEA is in an unnecessary state of
confusion. Even assuming that the constitutional limitations imposed on
Congress with respect to the right to jury trial are represented by
Katchen, there is no permissible justification for denying the right to jury
trial in an ADEA action for any issues related to claims for relief availa-
ble under the Act, including reinstatement. Legal issues should not be
magically converted into equitable issues by federal statutes that permit
equitable remedies in cases that presented legal issues before an equita-
ble remedy was available. Neither the equitable clean-up doctrine, thinly
disguised through a characterization of legal claims as integral parts of
equitable ones, nor a grant of "discretion" to the courts should be al-
lowed to accomplish a like result.
MICHAEL B. MINTON
114. After contrasting Title VII's purely equitable relief with Title VIII's
"simple authorization of an action for actual and punitive damages," the Court
considered the "discretion" argument. 415 U.S. at 197.
1978] 269
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/4
